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Abstract
In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with de-
fault. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lenders claim in
the hierarchy of debt of a Þrm, we consider a Þrm that issues two bonds with different ma-
turities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both
debt renegotiation and capital structure of a Þrm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that
renegotiation brings about a signiÞcant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dis-
persed through different channels: increasing the value of the Þrm, reallocating payments,
and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively
different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and
renegotiation of the entire debt.
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1 Introduction
In the recent years the work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) on option pricing
has become an important tool in the valuation of corporate debt. The option-pricing approach
has been used extensively in the valuation of stocks, bonds, convertible bonds and warrants.
The theoretical insights of this approach are extremely useful, but unfortunately, the predictive
power of this model has been widely challenged by the empirical tests. These empirical results
signaled possible limitations of the model. Two of the most important limitations are the fact
that default is assumed to occur only when the Þrm exhausts its assets and that the Þrm is
assumed to have a simple capital structure.
The assumption of default occurring when the Þrm exhausts its assets was widely criticized.
These critics lead to the conclusion that a credit valuation model has to provide a genuine
representation of the relationship between the state of the Þrm and the events that might
inßuence the deterioration of the Þrm value. Pursuing this goal, a new approach to credit
valuation was introduced. This approach combines theory of bankruptcy and default with
modern Þnancial theory. The Þrst to use this new approach were Leland (1994) and Leland
and Toft (1996) who consider the design of optimal structure and the pricing of debt with
credit risk. They allow bankruptcy to be determined endogenously and they also examine
the pricing of bonds with arbitrary maturities. Later on, Anderson and Sundaresan (1996)
explicitly describe the interaction between bondholders and shareholders. They obtain in this
way an endogenous reorganization boundary and deviations from the absolute priority rule.
Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996) extend the previous model from a discrete-time to a
continuous-time model. Using this continuous-time setup they compute closed-form solutions
and perform comparative statics. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) also derive closed form
solution for debt and equity modeling explicitly the shutdown condition for a Þrm. Fries, Miller
and Perraudin (1997) price corporate debt in an industry with entry and exit of Þrms. Allowing
for contract negotiation, Mella-Barral (1999) characterizes the dynamics of debt reorganization
and endogenizes departures from the absolute priority rule. Fan and Sundaresan (2000) provide
also a framework for debt renegotiation by endogenizing both the reorganization boundary and
the optimal sharing rule between equity and debt holders upon default. Finally, Anderson and
Sundaresan (2000) perform a comparison among the models of Merton (1974), Leland (1994),
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) showing that the
models including endogenous bankruptcy are to some extent superior to Mertons model.
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A step forward in surmounting the limitation of a simple capital structure was made by
Black and Cox (1976), who developed a model for pricing subordinate debt where both senior
and junior debt have the same maturity. They follow Mertons approach (1974), in which risky
debt is interpreted as a portfolio containing the safe assets and a short position in a put option
written on the value of the Þrms assets. Their junior debt could be seen as a portfolio comprising
two calls: a long position in a call with a strike price equal to the face value of the senior bond
and a short position in a call with a strike price equal to the sum of the face values of the two
bonds.
The theory developed till now to overcome these limitations was concerned with the evalu-
ation of credit status for securities with the same time of maturity and from the point of view
of a particular lender. However, it is also important which are the maturity time and the place
of the lenders claim in the hierarchy of the debt of a Þrm. It is not enough that the value of
the Þrm is sufficient for paying the debt at its maturity. If the Þrm cannot fulÞll the payment
obligations at interim periods, than the payment of the debt that has later maturity will be
affected. As a result, claims that have earlier maturity and are junior may trigger default and,
therefore, bankruptcy.
In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with different
seniority and different maturity. We are interested in studying how renegotiation of debt and
capital structure of the Þrm affect the prices of the bonds with default. Since the debt can be
held by different bondholders we permit renegotiation in case of default on the early-maturity
bond and this leads to strategic behaviour by bondholders. Incorporating strategic behaviour by
bondholders in the valuation framework suggests that the presence of renegotiation possibilities
when there are multiple creditors may lead to qualitatively different implications for pricing.
Our approach is similar to the one of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), but differs from it in
two important points. First, we concentrate our attention on the effects of strategic behaviour of
the bondholders only, the shareholders being in our model the residual claimants. Second, and
more important, we consider the renegotiation of the entire amount of debt and not only on the
cupon payment. This approach is used also by Christensen et al. (2002) in a single borrower
setup, but the problem of renegotiating the entire amount of debt is reinforced in our case by the
strategic behaviour of the two bondholders. The presence of two bondholders helps us also to
emphasize the important role the bond covenants play in a Þrm with a reacher capital structure
and when we allow for strategic behaviour of bondholders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic valuation
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model. We describe directly the more complex model in which we allow for renegotiation. We
present here the timing of the events, and the game that takes place between the bondholders in
the case the Þrm is not able to honour its payments at date 1. Section 3 studies the equilibrium
of the Bondholders game. Section 4 proceeds with the valuation of the bonds. We compare
the prices of the bonds in the model speciÞed in Section 2, but also in two simpler models, the
purpose of this comparison being to detect the effect on the price of bonds the capital structure
of the Þrm and renegotiation bring about. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results and gives
some directions for further research.
2 The Model
There are three agents in our economy: two creditors (commercial banks, mutual or pension
funds, etc.) and a Þrm - issuer of debt securities (corporation, commercial bank, government
etc.). All three agents are risk neutral.
The creditors live for two periods and have different liquidity preference. We assume that
the preferences of the two creditors are represented by the utility function Ui(c1, c2) = c1+ δic2,
where c1, c2 represent the consumption of the creditors in period 1 and 2, respectively, and δi
represents creditor is discount factor. To emphasize the fact that the creditors have different
liquidity preferences, we assume that the discount factor is very small for the Þrst creditor, and
is very high for the second one. Consequently, the Þrst creditor will prefer to consume in the
Þrst period and the second creditor will prefer to consume in the second period.
Consider now a simple situation in which the current liabilities of the Þrm are assumed to be
0. Thus, the Þrm has a simple capital structure: equity and debt. Let us assume that markets
are complete and frictionless, there are no taxes and the agents can borrow at the riskless interest
rate r.
We assume that the Þrm owns a project and issues two zero coupon bonds and equity to
raise funds meant to cover the Þnancial needs of this project at date 0. As a result, the initial
investment in the project is equal to the total amount raised by issuing debt and equity. There
is a junior bond with face value D1 that matures at date 1, and a senior bond with face value D2
that is due to mature at date 2. We assume that initial value of the Þrm is exogenous and equal
to the total investment in the project. Since our economy is characterized by 0 corporate taxes,
there is no distinction between the value of the assets of the Þrm and the value of the Þrm itself.
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This value is V = E + B1 + B2, where E is the value of equity, B1 is the total market value
of the junior corporate bond and B2 is the total market value of the senior one. The project
consists of a technology that transforms the initial investment in a random return. We model
the technology as a binomial process: the value of the Þrm V moves up to V u with probability
p and down to V d with probability 1− p, where u > 1 > d. In what it follows we will denote by
Vi the value of the Þrm at time i.
At date 0 the Þrm issues a short-term bond B1 which is junior and a long-term debt B2 which
is senior.1 There are two covenants speciÞed in the indenture of the senior bond: limitation on
priority and cross-default. The limitation on priority provision restricts the shareholders to issue
additional debt which may dilute the senior bondholder claim on the assets of the Þrm. In our
case it requires that in the process of debt restructuring only junior bond can be issued. The
cross-default provision speciÞes that the Þrm is in default when it fails to meet its obligations
on any of its debt issues, that is in the case of default on the short-term debt, the senior debt
becomes payable immediately.
Both bonds are subject to a positive probability of default. The existence of this positive
default probability implies that the debt contracts should specify two contingency provisions:
the lower reorganization boundary and the compensation to be received by the creditors when
this lower reorganization boundary is reached.
The lower reorganization boundary represents the cut-off point where the liquid assets of the
Þrm are not sufficient to meet the obligations of the debt contracts. When this cut-off point is
reached, we say that Þnancial distress takes place. As long as they meet the contractual oblig-
ations, shareholders have the residual control rights and debtholders cannot force liquidation.
However, when the lower reorganization boundary is reached and, consequently, shareholders
default on their debt contracts, the bondholders have a choice between allowing liquidation by
court appointed trustee (Chapter 7 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code) or renegotiating the debt con-
tracts. In the case of liquidation the Þrm sells its assets, pays a liquidation cost and what is left
is allocated between bondholders. In the case bondholders choose to renegotiate the debt, this
can be done either out of court (workout) or in court (Chapter 11 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
Since we do not intend to model the shareholders speciÞcally and in case of default the control
of the Þrm is transferred from stockholders to bondholders, our renegotiation procedure will
1The assumption is without loss of generality and is ment to illustrate the point that junior bond with earlier
maturity can trigger default on the long-term, senior bond. The case when the short-term bond is senior and the
long-term bond is junior is similar with Black and Cox (1976) and it will not involve debt renegotiation.
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mirror the restructuring through out-of-court arrangements.2
A very important assumption of our model is that the compensation received by bondholders
after bankruptcy follows the absolute priority rule. According to this absolute priority rule the
payments to debtholders should be made before any payment is made to shareholders. Also, the
payments of the debtholders are made such that the senior claim payments should be always
made before any payments are made to the junior claims. We also assume that in case of default
of the debt contracts the debtholders can use the assets without any loss of value (except the
liquidation costs).
2.1 Time Structure
We set up the model in discrete time because it allows the modeling of the bankruptcy process
to be more transparent. The sequence of events is the following:
Date 0: The Þrm issues both short-term and long-term debt B1 and B2, respectively. The
promised Þnal payments are D1 and D2, respectively. Creditor 1 buys the bond B1 and Creditor
2 buys the bond B2.
Date 1: Maturity date of bond B1. The stockholders pay off the Bondholder 1 if they can.
If they cannot, the ownership of the Þrm passes to the bondholders. The bondholders decide if
the Þrm enters a liquidation or a restructuring process. In case of liquidation, the Þrm pays the
liquidation costs L and then the bondholders are paid according to the absolute priority rule.
In case of restructuring, the Þrm either changes the maturity of junior debt at t = 2, or issues
new debt with maturity at t = 2. We assume that there is a cost of restructuring K and this
cost is smaller than the cost of liquidation L (more precisely, we assume that K <
r
1 + r
L, and
L < V0d).
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Date 2: Maturity date of bond B2. Conditional on the fact that the Þrm did not get
bankrupt in the previous period, the stockholders pay off the bondholders if they can. If they
cannot, the Þrm enters in a liquidation process. The control of the Þrm is transferred from
stockholders to the bondholders. The Þrm is liquidated and the bondholders are paid according
to the absolute priority rule.
2According to Gilson et al. (1990), almost 50% of the companies in Þnancial distress avoid liquidation through
out-of-court debt restructuring. The advantage of this procedure is that workouts are usually a lot less expensive
than Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure.
3Empirical studies show that the costs of debt restructuring are signiÞcantly lower than the costs of liquidation.
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2.2 The Game
At date 1, the value of the Þrm is V1. The payment obligation of the Þrm at this moment amounts
to D1. If the value of the Þrm V1 exceeds D1, the stockholders honour the debt obligation by
selling out assets that amount to D1. Otherwise, the Þrm defaults and the stockholders give
up the control in favour of bondholders. Once the Þrm defaults on one of its payments all the
creditors have the right to demand information, and therefore they discover the value of the
Þrm at date 1, V1. If the value of the Þrm following restructuring, V ∗2 , is expected to be very
low ( i.e. E[V ∗2 ] ≤ D2) both bondholders realize that issuing additional debt will not make
them better off. Due to the existence of the senior bond covenant, the debt issued at date 1
has to be junior to the debt B2 and therefore, the expected payment to this newly issued debt
will be zero, no bondholder being willing to buy this debt. If the value of the Þrm is such that
E[V ∗2 ] > D2, the bondholders choose between liquidating and rescuing the Þrm. We consider
the case when unanimity it not necessarily for the reorganization to be approved (see Franks
and Torous (1989)). Consequently, liquidation occurs only when both bondholders are taking
this decision. In the case of liquidation, the assets of the Þrm are sold and the payments are
made to the bondholders. If one of the bondholders wants to rescue the Þrm, then the debt will
be restructured independently of the others action. There are different ways to restructure the
debt: reducing the principal obligations, increasing maturity of the debt or accepting equity of
the Þrm. We assume that the Bondholder 1 restructures the debt by increasing the maturity of
the debt. On the other hand, if the Bondholder 2 wants to prevent liquidation he can do so only
if the Þrm issues new debt.4 The restructuring of the debt can be done only if the Þrm pays a
cost K, which, for simplicity, we assume that it is the same in both cases.
Let us see now what happens at date 2. The situation is very similar, but the allocation of
payments depends on what happened at date 1. First, if the payments for the bond B1 where
made at date 1, the only payment left to be honoured at date 2 is the senior bond B2. In this
case the value of the Þrm becomes cV1 = V1 − D1. Therefore, if the value of the Þrm at time
2, that is cV2, exceeds the payment obligation D2, the stockholders honour the debt obligation.
Otherwise, they will liquidate the Þrm and obtain the assets value cV2 net of liquidation cost. In
the case the Þrm honoured its payment at date 1, we have to take into account that for doing
4 It does not pay for an outsider to undertake restructuring since the value of the Þrm is small, V1 < D1. If
a new creditor is willing to invest D1, the value of the Þrm at date 2 will be in expected terms (V1 −K)(1 + r)
which is smaller than D1(1 + r), the amount that should be paid to the new investor. Moreover, the new issued
debt has always lower seniorage than the existent debt so he will be paid only after the senior debt is paid.
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so the Þrm is liquidating a part of its assets equal to D1, and the value of the Þrm decreases
therefore by this amount cV1 = V1 −D1.
Second, if at date 1 we had default on the obligation, three possible cases might occur: liqui-
dation, rescue by Bondholder 1, and rescue by Bondholder 2. If liquidation takes place at date 1,
the game is already over. The Þrm sells out the assets, pays a liquidation cost L and makes the
payments according to the priority rule. Bondholder 1 owns the senior bond and he will receive
min
½
V1 − L, D2
1 + r
¾
. Bondholder 2 will receive what is left, i.e. max
½
V1 − D2
1 + r
− L, 0
¾
.
When restructuring takes places, the Þrm is paying the restructuring cost K, and thus, the
value of the Þrm becomes V ∗1 = V1 −K. If the restructuring of the Þrm is made by Bondholder
1, at date 2 he will be entitled to a payment D01 which is junior to D2 . If the value of the Þrm
at date 2, V ∗2 exceeds the total payment obligation D01 +D2, the stockholders honour the debt
obligation. Otherwise, the Bondholder 1 will receive max{0, V ∗2 − D2} and Bondholder 2 will
receive min{V ∗2 ,D2}. If the Þrm is in default at date 2, we have to subtract the liquidation cost
from these payoffs. In order to keep it simple at this point we will write the exact formula for
these payoffs later on. Finally, if the rescue of the Þrm was made by Bondholder 2, at date 2
the Bondholder 2 will own two bonds and he will be entitled to a payment of D001 + D2. The
payment he receives depends again on the realization of V ∗2 and it is min{D001 +D2, V ∗2 }.
When the Bondholder 2 is willing to pay the debt, the Þrm will issue new debt which
amounts to D1. If Bondholder 2 is the only one to rescue the Þrm, the Bondholder 1 will receive
exactly the amount he received in case of liquidation max
½
V1 − D2
1 + r
− L, 0
¾
, the amount
D1−max
½
V1 − D2
1 + r
− L, 0
¾
being used for increasing the value of the Þrm. Hence, the value
of the Þrm will be in this case V ∗∗1 = V1 +D1 −K −max
½
V1 − D2
1 + r
− L, 0
¾
. Finally, in the
case both bondholders are willing to rescue the Þrm, the Þrm will accept both offers, the new
value of the Þrm becoming in this case V ∗∗∗1 = V1 +D1 − 2K. The Þrm will postpone the debt
due to Bondholder 1 by changing the face value of the debt to D01 and also by issuing new debt
with face value D
00
1 . The two new types of debt are junior to the debt B2 and they have the
same seniority.
The payments made at date 2 in the case of restructuring for the new debt D01 and D002 are
chosen such that there exist no arbitrage opportunities between the Þrst and second period.
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3 The Equilibrium of the Bondholders Game
We study now the case when the Þrm is not able to meet its payment obligation at date 1,
i.e. V1 < D1, but the value of the Þrm is still high enough to allow for restructuring, meaning
E[V ∗2 ] ≥ D2. This can be written equivalently as
V1 −K ≥ D2
pu+ (1− p)d.
Let us deÞne V as
V =
D2
pu+ (1− p)d +K.
As we have already explained, the ownership of the Þrm passes into the hands of the bond-
holders and they decide whether to rescue or to liquidate the Þrm. We assume that the bond-
holders have complete information, the game is common knowledge, and that they act in their
own interest. Moreover, at the beginning of the game, they can observe the realization of the
Þrm value, V1.
Equilibrium in the bondholders game consists of the actions of the bondholders that con-
stitute the best response. When making the decision the bondholders have to take into consid-
eration both current period payoff and continuation payoff.
In order to characterize the solution we need to specify the following notations. The actions
of Bondholder 1 are {L1, R1} and the actions of Bondholder 2 are {L2, R2}, where Li means
that bondholder i chooses to liquidate the Þrm and Ri means that the bondholder i chooses to
restructure the Þrm.
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium Bondholder 1 chooses to restructure, R1, and Bondholder 2
chooses to liquidate, L1.
The capital structure of the Þrm and the covenants of the senior debt play a very important
role in our model. While the cross-default provision brings about the renegotiation of the debt
contracts, the limitation on priority drives the equilibrium of the bondholders game. As we have
seen already the value of the Þrm is utmost when both bondholders are willing to restructure
the Þrm. The Pareto efficient equilibrium consists of bondholders restructuring and invigorate
thus the Þrm through their action. However, in equilibrium Bondholder 2 chooses to liquidate.
The grounds of his decision comes from the fact that his overall position in the hierarchy of
debt is downgraded. At the beginning he had a senior bond. If both bondholders undertake
restructuring Bondholder 2 will have a senior bond as before but also a junior bond. This last
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bond has actually the same seniority as the seniority of the bond owned by Bondholder 1 and
therefore the payments on these two junior bonds will be made at once. Therefore, the payments
of the Bondholder 2 are reduced and in consequence he chooses to liquidate the Þrm.
There are also two other important issues to be taken into account when solving for the
equilibrium: Bondholder 1 owns a junior debt and default occurs when the value of the Þrm is
very small. First, Bondholder 1 owns a junior debt and he receives his payment after the senior
bond payment is made. Therefore, the smaller the value of the Þrm, the smaller the amount
that is left after senior bond payment. As a result, his best response to any of Bondholder 2
actions is to restructure and increase the value of the Þrm. Thus, if Bondholder 2 wants to
liquidate, Bondholder 1 is obviously better off by restructuring since restructuring gives him at
least as high equal expected payoff. This happens because the bondholder will never undertake
restructuring when the expected payoff is smaller than the present value of the debt (see the
non-arbitrage condition). If Bondholder 2 wants to rescue, Bondholder 1 is gaining even more
because the value of the Þrm is increased more by the participation of Bondholder 2, but the
newly issued debt for both bondholders has the same seniority.
Second, default occurs when the value of the Þrm is small. Since Bondholder 2 knows that
and owns a senior bond, it does not pay for him to reinvest and accumulate debt. He prefers to
leave Bondholder 1 to rescue the Þrm. As a result, Bondholder 2s best response to R1 is L2.
In the case the value of the Þrm net of liquidation costs is still high enough to cover the debt
due to him
D2
1 + r
, we have that the best response of Bondholder 2 when Bondholder 1 chooses
to liquidate is to liquidate. We also obtain that, for some small values of the parameters, the
best response to L1 is to restructure. However, for these values we have already argued that
the bondholders are not going to invest and accumulate more debt because if they do, they are
going to lose. Under these circumstances, we can conclude that the equilibrium of the game is
(R1, L2).
Corollary 2 The equilibrium of the bondholders’ game is preserved even when K = L = 0.
If we substitute the parameters K = L = 0 in the proof of Proposition 1, the proof is still
valid. The corollary emphasizes the fact that the equilibrium of the bondholders game is driven
by the capital structure of the Þrm (and the presence of covenants) and not by liquidation costs.
This happens again only for the values of the parameters for which restructuring makes sense,
i.e. in this case V1 ≥ D2
pu+ (1− p)d.
Once the bondholders announced their decisions, the shareholders are compelled to follow
10
the decisions of the bondholders. They play a passive role since the ownership was already
conceded to the bondholders. Since the cost associated with the restructuring process is the
same, independent of who is restructuring the Þrm, the shareholders are indifferent between
changing the maturity of bond B1 at t = 2 and issuing new debt.
4 The Valuation of the Bonds
In order to price a bond we have to compute the present value of the expected bond payments.
The prices of the bonds are inßuenced by the characteristics of the project to be undertaken but
also by the structure of the Þrm. We focus on determining the lower reorganization boundary
and the compensation to be received by bondholders and shareholders. Once we know the
payments received by every agent, we can compute the prices at date 0 for the two bonds and
equity by computing the net present value of future payments. We will determine the prices of
the bonds in three different setups and compare the corresponding prices.
First, we will compute the prices of the two bonds in the model we presented above. We are
interested in Þnding out how introducing debt renegotiation will affect the value of the bonds.
For this purpose, we will compare the prices we obtained, B1 and B2 with the prices of two
similar bonds (the same maturity date and the same debt face value) B001 and B002 . The bonds
B001 and B002 are issued by a Þrm with a similar capital structure, but in which the bondholders
are not allowed to restructure the Þrm in case of default.
We will see that changes in the characteristics of the project (which can be seen as caused by
changes in the credit quality of the issuer) are inducing different bond prices. However, it is not
the case that only the characteristics of the project are inßuencing the valuation of the bonds.
The prices of the bonds can also be inßuenced by the presence of other bonds with different
maturity or different seniority. To isolate this effect we compare the prices of the short-term
bond B001 with the price of a short-term bond B01 and the price of the long-term bond B002 with
the price of a long-term bond B02. The bonds B01 and B02 are bonds with similar face value to B001
and B002 and each of them is a bond in a Þrm where this is the only debt outstanding.
Before proceeding with the valuation, let us Þrst determine the equilibrium market interest
rate. We assume that the Þrm that owns the project V0 is Þnanced completely with equity. We
determine the interest rate from the following non-arbitrage condition: an investor should be
indifferent between investing in equity in the Þrm fully Þnanced by equity or in a riskless asset.
On the one hand, the expected payoff from investing $1 in equity is the total expected payment
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of the project divided by the value of equity q, i.e.
pV0u+ (1− p)V0d
q
. Since the Þrm is Þnanced
fully with equity, we obtain that q = V0, and therefore, the expected payoff from investing $1
in equity is pu+ (1− p)d. On the other, the expected payment from investing $1 in the riskless
asset is 1 + r. As a result, our non-arbitrage condition, becomes pu+ (1− p)d = 1 + r.
4.1 Valuation for B1 and B2
As we already mentioned in the presentation of the model, the payments in the case of restruc-
turing have to be such that there are no arbitrage opportunities. First, the Bondholder 1 should
be indifferent between the payment he is entitled to receive this period, D1 and the expected
payment he will obtain next period if he decides to postpone the maturity of the bond D01.5
Thus, we have D1 =
1
1 + r
E1 [min{V ∗2 −D2,D01}] , where as explained above, V ∗1 = V1 − K.
Second, the Bondholder 2 should be indifferent between rescuing the Þrm by paying D1 at
date 1 and receiving D001 next period. However, he is aware of the fact that if he restructures
the Þrm, its value at date 1 will increase at least by D1 − max
½
V1 − D2
1 + r
− L, 0
¾
. If we
deÞne V ∗∗1 = V1 −K +D1 −max
½
V1 − D2
1 + r
− L, 0
¾
, we can write the arbitrage condition
D1 =
1
1 + r
E1[min{V ∗∗2 −D2,D001}].
The price of the two bonds will depend critically on the relationship between the two debt
face values D1 and D2.
Remark 1 In case of default none of the bondholders will be willing to rescue the firm if
D1 <
D2
pu+ (1− p)d +K ≡ V .
In case of default we have V1 ≤ D1. However, the bondholders are willing to rescue the Þrm
only if V1 ≥ V . Since V1 ≤ D1 < V , although we allow the bondholders to renegotiate they
will not be willing to restructure the Þrm. Hence, the value of the bonds and equity will be the
same as in the case when we do not allow for renegotiation. Therefore, the interesting case for
our analysis is the case when D1 ≥ V . While looking at the effects of debt renegotiation on the
prices of bonds we will concentrate our attention only on this case because this is the case when
the strategic behaviour of bondholders might lead to restructuring.
However, when V ≤ D1 we will have both cases when the bondholders are willing to re-
structure and cases when they are not. Thus, if V1 ≤ V the bondholders will not be willing to
5The bondholder is choosing exactly the quantity that makes him indifferent. He will never choose a larger
amount because by doing so either he receives V ∗2 −D2 or an arbitrage opportunity exists.
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rescue the Þrm since for these values of V1 the expected value of the Þrm is less than D2, the
face value of debt due to Bondholder 2 at date 2. Since the debt issued at date 1 is junior to
debt D2 of Bondholder 2, the expected payment is 0, and none of the creditors is willing to buy
this debt. If V ≤ V1 ≤ D1, the expected payment to the newly issued debt is positive and the
bondholders play the game described above. The payoffs of the two bondholders (and therefore,
the valuation formula of the bonds) depend both on the face values of the debt and on the initial
value V0.
In the case when D1 ≥ V , the strategic behaviour of the bondholders affects the payoffs
of the bonds at date 1, and thus, the valuation formula is changed. In this case liquidation
occurs for values of the Þrm smaller than a new threshold V =
D2
pu+ (1− p)d +K, this thresh-
old being smaller than the threshold we had before (D1). If V1 ≤ V , we have default; the
Þrm liquidates its assets and the bondholders share the payments. The payoff of Bondholder
1 is max
½
V1 − L− D2
1 + r
, 0
¾
, while the payoff of Bondholder 2 is min
½
V1 − L, D2
1 + r
¾
. If
V ≤ V1 < D1, the Þrm is not able to honour its debt obligation, but it is not liquidated. In
this case, the bondholders decide to restructure the debt. In equilibrium, Bondholder 1 res-
cues the Þrm by postponing its debt maturity till date 2, the payoffs of the two bondholders
being
1
1 + r
E1
h
max{0,min{V ∗2 −D2,D01}− L · I{V1|D2<V ∗2 <D2+D01}(V1)}
i
for Bondholder 1 and
1
1 + r
E1[min{V ∗2 − L,D2}] for Bondholder 2. In case the Þrm does not default at date 1 the
payoff of Bondholder 1 is D1. The Bondholder 2 waits till date 2, the maturity date of its debt,
and he receives then min{bV2,D2}− L · I{cV2|bV2<D2}(bV2). He receives the entitled debt D2 if the
value of the debt is smaller than the value of the Þrm. Otherwise, he receives the value of the
Þrm net of liquidation costs.
As we can see in Figure 1 the price of the short-term bond is increasing in V0. There are
two kinks in the price function. The Þrst one is the result of the upper state value of the Þrm
becoming higher than the face value of the short-term debt D1 (in our example when V0 = 5)
and the second when also the lower state value of the Þrm exceeds this amount (V0 = 20).
However, the price of long-term debt is not anymore an increasing function of V0. When the
value of the Þrm becomes higher than the face value of the short-term debt D1, the Þrm is selling
off assets amounting to D1, and therefore, the value of the Þrm is decreasing. Consequently, for
these values of V0 we detect a sharp decrease in the price of the long term bond.
The price of equity is computed in the same manner. According to the priority rule the
equity owners are the last ones to be paid. So, if we had default at date 1 they would receive
13
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Figure 1: Prices of the short-term bond and the long-term bond when debt restruc-
turing is allowed. The values of parameters are: D1 = 10,D2 = 6,K = 0.4, L = 0.02,
p = 0.7, u = 2, d = 0.5.
nothing. Then, if the value of parameters still allows for restructuring, we have two cases. First,
if after restructuring we have default at date 2, the equity owners will be left with nothing.
Secondly, if we do not have default at date 2, they will receive the value of the Þrm net of the
payments due to the two bondholders V ∗2 −D01 −D2. If we did not have default at date 1, the
equity owners would receive the value of the Þrm minus the payment to the Bondholder 2. Thus,
if we reach the date 2, the equity owners will receive nothing in case we have default at date 2,
andcV2−D2 in case we do not have default at date 2. Once we have found the valuation formula
for the two bonds and for equity, we can also compute the value of the Þrm V and we notice that
we do not obtain the initial value of the project because we have to subtract liquidation and
restructuring costs. As expected, in the case where we have these costs the Modigliani-Miller
theorem does not hold good. Since in our model we allow for renegotiation, we want to see if this
assumption jeopardizes the accomplishment of Modigliani-Miller theorem. For that we assume
that the restructuring and liquidation costs are zero, so we can eliminate their disturbing effect.
Once all the other assumptions of Modigliani-Miller theorem are fulÞlled, we see what happens
in our model. The Þrst step is to determine how the behaviour of the agents changes when we
set K = L = 0. As we already stated in the Corollary 2, the equilibrium of bondholders game is
the same when we set K = L = 0. Consequently, the payoffs of the two bondholders are exactly
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the same, except that we substitute K = L = 0 in the respective formulas. Since renegotiation
does not involve any dissipative cost and the outcome of the project is divided between the
agents, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 If K = L = 0, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds even when renegotiation is
permitted.
We obtain, hence, that the value of the Þrm remains the same even when we allow for
renegotiation. The allocation of the payoffs is different when we allow renegotiation, but in the
absence of liquidation and restructuring costs the value of the Þrm is unchanged. However,
we will see later that the presence of renegotiation will offset the effect of liquidation and
restructuring costs on the value of the Þrm when
r
1 + r
L > K > 0.
4.2 Valuation for B01 and B
0
2
As shown above, the payments of the two bonds, and therefore, the values of the bonds depend
on the face values of the debt and on the initial value V0. Let us consider now the following
two cases of a similar Þrm (with a similar project) but with a different capital structure. First,
we consider a Þrm with only one outstanding bond, a bond with maturity date at t = 1 and
with face value D1 and equity E0. Second, we consider the case of a Þrm with only one bond
outstanding, a bond with maturity date 2 and with face value D2 and equity E00.
If we assume that at date 1 the only outstanding debt is B01, the cash ßow depends only on
the realization of the value of the Þrm V1. If the value of the Þrms is high enough to pay the
debt, V1 ≥ D1, the bondholder receives what he is entitled to (i.e. D1). Otherwise, he receives
the amount that results from liquidating the Þrm. Since we assume that liquidation is costly,
in the case V1 ≤ D1 we have to subtract from the value of the Þrm the liquidation cost L. We
have also computed the price of equity. As expected, the shareholders obtain nothing in case of
default at date 1 and they receive V1 −D1 in case of non-default.
We consider now the second case where the Þrm issues a bond with maturity date 2 and
with face value D2 and it issues equity E00.When the only outstanding debt is B02 at date 2, we
are interested only if the value of the Þrm at t = 2, V2, is high enough to pay the debt. If this
is the case, i.e. V2 ≥ D2, the bondholder receives what he is entitled to (i.e., D2). Otherwise,
he receives the amount that results from liquidating the Þrm V2 − L. Similarly to the previous
case, we Þnd the price of equity. In case of default, the shareholders do not receive anything.
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Otherwise, they receive what is left after the payment is done to the bondholder who owns
B002 , V2 −D2.
4.3 Valuation for B001 and B002
We consider now a Þrm with the following capital structure: equity, a zero-coupon bond B001
with maturity date t = 1 and face value D1, and a zero-coupon bond B002 with maturity date
t = 2 and face value D2. However, we assume now that the bondholders are not able to rescue
the Þrm in case of default at date 1. We obtain the prices for the two bonds B001 and B002 in a
similar manner to the case when we do allow for debt restructuring.
If V1 ≤ D1, we have default on the junior debt at date 1. Since we do not allow the
bondholders to rescue the Þrm, the default at date 1 will trigger liquidation. The Þrm sells its
assets, pays the liquidation costs L and then the bondholders are paid according to the priority
rule. The payoff of Bondholder 2 is min
½
V1 − L, D2
1 + r
¾
. He is the Þrst one to be paid since
his debt is senior to the debt owned by Bondholder 1. Bondholder 1 receives what is left, i.e.
max
½
V1 − L− D2
1 + r
, 0
¾
. In case the Þrm does not default at date 1 the payoff of Bondholder
1 is D1. The value of the Þrm decreases by this amount and becomes cV1 = V1−D1. Bondholder
2 waits till date 2, the maturity date of its debt. If the value of the debt is smaller than the
value of the Þrm, he will receive the entitled debt D2. Otherwise, he receives the value of the
Þrm net of liquidation costs bV2−L. Again, since equity owners are the last ones to receive their
payments (according to priority rule), in case of default at date 1 they do not receive anything.
Then, if default does not occur at date 1, they will receive at date 2 what is left after payment
is made to Bondholder 2. They do not receive anything in case of default at date 2, and they
receive cV2 −min{cV2,D2} in case of non-default.
If we compare the values of the Þrm we obtained in the two cases (with and without restruc-
turing), we notice that for the parameters values for which restructuring takes place (V < V1 ≤
D1) the value of the Þrm changes from V1−L to 1
1 + r
E1
h
V ∗2 − L · I{V ∗2 |V ∗2 ≤D2+D01}(V ∗2 )
i
. We as-
sumed thatK <
r
1 + r
Lwhich implies V1 − L < (V1 −K)− 1
1 + r
E1
h
L · I{V ∗2 |V ∗2 ≤D2+D01}(V ∗2 )
i
.
It is interesting to notice that if the liquidation and bankruptcy costs are different from 0, the
strategic behaviour induces a change in the value of Þrm, and therefore, it has an offsetting
effect in the violation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
In computing the prices we use the interest rate to discount the payments received. To
perform the comparison we need to see if the interest rate is indeed the same in all the cases.
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We compare the equilibrium interest rate in the case of a Þrm Þnanced entirely by equity with
our two cases when the Þrm is Þnanced by equity, short-term debt and long-term debt and
we allow or not for renegotiation. As the following lemma shows, since the bondholders and
shareholders are building their expectations rationally, neither the different structure of the Þrm
nor the presence of renegotiation changes the equilibrium interest rate.
Lemma 2 If the firm is financed by equity, short-term debt and long-term debt, the interest
rate still satisfies pu+ (1− p)d = 1+ r independently of the fact that we allow for renegotiation
or not.
4.4 Price Comparison
Let us consider now the two cases of the Þrm with the same capital structure: a short-term bond,
a long-term bond and equity, the difference lies in the fact that we allow or not for restructuring
in case of default. We compare the prices of the two short-term bonds B1 and B001 and of the
two long-term bonds B2 and B002 , respectively.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the short-term prices. The values of parameters are: D1 = 10,
D2 = 6,K = 0.4, L = 0.02, p = 0.7, u = 2, d = 0.5.
When deriving the equilibrium of the game we obtained that the Bondholder 1 is better off
undertaking restructuring independently of the action of the Bondholder 2. Since in equilibrium
the Bondholder 1 chooses to restructure, it is obvious that his payoff has to be higher when
restructuring takes place than when liquidation occurs. Moreover, by restructuring he postpones
17
or avoids costly liquidation giving the Þrm the possibility to recover. As a result, we obtain that
his expected payments are higher and consequently, that the price at date 0 of the short-term
bond is higher if strategic interaction between bondholders is allowed.
In Figure 2 we see that there are two ranges for V0 where the price of the short-term bond is
higher in the case we allow for debt restructuring. The values of V0 for which this happens are
exactly the two possible cases when the value of the Þrm is lower than D1 but higher than V .
Since the price of the short-term bond is higher we have a decrease in the spread of short-term
bond when strategic behaviour is allowed.
However, the equilibrium payoff of the Bondholder 2 is lower than in the case both bondhold-
ers liquidate. Since the best response of the Bondholder 1 is to restructure when Bondholder
2 liquidates, liquidation by both bondholders will not be an equilibrium for V1 > V . So, Bond-
holder 2 ends up with a payoff lower than in the case we do not allow for debt restructuring.
Since in the case we allow for restructuring the expected payoffs are smaller, we will have also
that the price at date 0 of the long-term bond is smaller and consequently, the spread is higher.
Similarly to the case of short-term bond prices we have two regions where price differ. This can
be easily seen in the Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the long-term prices. The values of parameters are: D1 = 10,
D2 = 6,K = 0.4, L = 0.02, p = 0.7, u = 2, d = 0.5.
As we have already explained, the bondholders payoffs are signiÞcantly changed when we
allow for debt restructuring. However, this is not the only issue here. We are interested to see
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how the presence of strategic behaviour is reßected in the payments, and consequently, in the
prices of bonds, but also to understand what lies behind these changes. Thus, there are different
channels in which strategic behaviour comes into play: through the change in the value of the
Þrm, through the reallocation of payments, through the possible changes in the hierarchy of
debt or avoiding costly liquidation.
We should also emphasize that in our models the bankruptcy and restructuring costs are
anticipated by the bondholders and therefore, they are incorporated in prices. The same happens
with the bankruptcy procedure. In the case when the bondholders do not restructure the debt,
the bankruptcy code predicts liquidation similar to Chapter 7 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Our
model suggests thus, that the prices of the bonds are also affected by the bankruptcy procedure.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the short-term prices in two Þrms with different capital
structure. The values of parameters are: D1 = 10,D2 = 6,K = 0.4, L = 0.02, p = 0.7,
u = 2, d = 0.5
Consider Þnally, the short-term bonds B001 and B01. As we have already explained, the two
bonds have the same face value D1 and maturity date 1. Their difference lies in the fact that
they are outstanding bonds in Þrms with different capital structure. We compare the two prices
and we obtain that the short-term bond has a higher price when this is the only outstanding
bond. The result is very intuitive. Since in case of default the payments are made according
to the priority rule, the price of a junior bond is inßuenced by the presence of another, senior
bond. In case of default, the owner of the bond B01 is paid immediately after the liquidation
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Figure 5: Comparison of the long-term prices in two Þrms with different capital
structure. The values of parameters are: D1 = 10,D2 = 6,K = 0.4, L = 0.02, p = 0.7,
u = 2, d = 0.5
costs are paid, while the owner of the bond B001 has to wait also for the senior debt to be paid.
So, the price of the bond B001 with maturity t = 1 is strictly lower in the presence of another
senior debt (even if this senior debt has later maturity).
We have also compared the price of the long-term bond B002 with the price of the bond B02. It
is quite intuitive that the value of a senior debt is lower or equal in the presence of a junior debt
with earlier maturity because the payment done to Bondholder 1 at date 1 decreases the value
of the Þrm, and therefore, may decrease the payment to Bondholder 2 at date 2. However, this
does not seem to be always the case. If at date 1, we have default on the obligation D1, we have
liquidation and Bondholder 2 receives min{V1 −L, D2
1 + r
}. Assume that the value of the Þrm is
high enough, such that min{V1−L, D2
1 + r
} = D2
1 + r
. Consider now what happens with the bond
B02. If the value of the Þrm is low enough to give rise to default of the second Þrm at date 2,
the payment to B02 is going to be lower than
D2
1 + r
and therefore, the price of the bond B002 is
going to be higher than the price B02. The insight is simple and it is the consequence of the fact
that the bond B002 is a senior bond. If the value of the Þrm is low, so it will lead almost surely
to default on B02 in several states at date 2, Bondholder 2 might be welcoming a liquidation at
date 1 which leaves him better off. However, he can be better off by cashing in its payment at
date 1, only if the value of the Þrm is not too low. The two regions in Figure 5 where the price
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of the senior bond is higher when there exists a short-term bond correspond exactly to this case.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we attempt to derive the prices of debt and equity and to analyze the implications
of strategic behaviour and capital structure of a Þrm on the prices of bonds. Our main result
is that both strategic behaviour and the capital structure of the Þrm have important effects on
the prices of bonds. To study these implications we set our problem in three different backdrops
and we compare the prices we obtain. The whole analysis has been conducted focusing on the
determination of the lower reorganization boundary and on the payoffs received by agents. We
investigate Þrst the inference of strategic behaviour of the agents on the prices of the bonds. For
that we compare the prices of the short-term and long-term bond in two Þrms with a similar
capital structure. The only difference between the two Þrms lies in the behaviour of the agents
in case of default at date 1, in one setting allowing the agents to step in and restructure the
debt. The model allows us also to understand the importance of the covenants of the bonds
in the case there are multiple creditors. We conclude that allowing for strategic behaviour of
bondholders leads to important changes in prices of bonds. In addition, we obtain an increase
in the value of the Þrm, but this increase takes place only when liquidation and restructuring
cost are different from zero. We conclude therefore, that strategic behaviour offsets partially
the loss provoked by these costs. However, the strategic behaviour by itself does not lead to
any detriment in the value of the Þrm because it just reallocates the present funds. Thus, when
there are no liquidation and restructuring costs, we obtain that the Modigliani-Miller theorem
holds.
Secondly, we consider the effect of capital structure of the Þrm on the prices of bonds. We
compare the prices of the short and long-term bond in the previous Þrm (without strategic
behaviour) with the prices of a short and a long-term bond, in a Þrm where the short-term bond
and respectively the long-term bond are the only outstanding debt. It is quite intuitive that the
presence of a senior bond decreases the value of a junior bond by comparison with the case when
the junior bond is the only bond outstanding. However, we obtain also that the presence of a
junior bond with earlier maturity can decrease the price of a senior bond with later maturity.
There are two cases when this happens. First case is the one when the value of the Þrm at date
1 is small and the Þrm cannot pay out its debt obligations. The Þrm is defaulting and goes
bankrupt. Since bankruptcy involves signiÞcant costs, the payments due to the senior bond are
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also endangered. The second case takes place when the Þrm is not defaulting at date 1, but the
value of the Þrm is not too high. At date 1 the Þrm is paying the untitled debt D1 and to do
that needs to liquidate a part of its assets. Hence, the value of the Þrm V1 decreases by D1 and
this induces a higher likelihood of default at date 2 on the senior bond.
Simple in essence, our model suggests that the presence of multiple creditors and of a reacher
capital structure is an important issue to be considered in pricing corporate debt.
Finally, we mention a possible extension of our work. As has been already pointed out by
Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996), the analysis of strategic contingent claims comes at
the cost of a substantial calculation time. To overcome this difficulty they recast the Anderson-
Sundaresan (1996) model in continuous time. Conditional on the success of the remodeling in
continuous time, we could proceed in replicating the work of Anderson et al. (1996). As we
already mentioned, they compare Mertons model with the one in Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996). It will be interesting to make a similar comparison between our model with strategic
claims and the one without strategical claims. This last model will be a slightly modiÞed version
of Black and Cox (1976), where we have to allow for different maturity dates. However, the task
is not trivial in our model because we consider the restructuring of entire debt and therefore we
will not be able to use the limit technique used by Anderson et al. (1996).
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